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“A Merciful Man”: Thomas Hardy et la pensée de l’(in)humanité
Adrian Tait
1 Late in 1895,  the Dorset  County Chronicle  and Somersetshire Gazette noted that the “pig-
killing  chapter”  in  Thomas  Hardy’s  latest  novel,  Jude  the  Obscure, was  about  to  be
reprinted by the Victorian Society for the Protection of Animals (quoted in Davis and
Gerber, 57-58). Whilst “bitterly attacked” by some, as the Chronicle and Gazette reported,
the  chapter  was  clearly  “viewed  differently  in  other  quarters”  (57-58),  and  it  duly
appeared in the December edition of the Society’s periodical, The Animal’s Friend. 
2 The controversy  surrounding the  chapter  was,  perhaps,  inevitable;  it  still  retains  its
power to shock. It opens amidst snow, as Jude and his wife Arabella prepare to butcher
the pig which they have been fattening through the autumn months (Hardy 2002, 57).
When the butcher is delayed, Jude and Arabella elect to kill the pig themselves. As the
animal  is  tied  down,  its  rage  gives  way  to  a  “cry  of  despair;  long-drawn,  slow and
hopeless” (58). Arabella exorts Jude to keep the animal “bleeding long”, that the meat
might be “well bled” (58). Jude refuses, and “plunged in the knife with all his might” (58):
However unworkmanlike the deed, it had been mercifully done. The blood flowed
out  in  a  torrent  instead  of  in  the  trickling  stream  she  had  desired.  The  dying
animal’s cry assumed its third and final tone, the shriek of agony; his glazing eyes
riveting themselves on Arabella with the eloquently keen reproach of a creature
recognizing at last the treachery of those who had seemed his only friends. (Hardy
2002, 59)
3 Almost inevitably,  these were details critics found difficult to stomach. Mrs.  Oliphant
thought the scene “horrible” (Cox 258). Jeanette L. Gilder, writing in the New York World,
called  it  “nauseating”,  and an “act  of  literary  suicide”  (Lerner  and Holmstrom 113).
“[D]oes Mr. Hardy really take pleasure in contemplating the process of pig-sticking?”
asked A. J. Butler in the National Review (Cox 290). 
4 In light of the controversy that the scene had already attracted – and given Hardy’s own
sensitivity to criticism – it may therefore seem surprising that he allowed the scene to be
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reproduced. In fact, he not only gave his permission, but offered it up for publication. On
15 November, he wrote to the Editor of the Animal’s Friend:
During the writing of a recent novel of  mine it  occurred to me that one of the
scenes might be useful in teaching mercy in the Slaughtering of Animals for the
meat-market – the cruelties involved in the business having been a great grief to
me for years. The story is now published, and I send herewith a proof of the scene
alluded to – of which I offer you gratuitously the right of publishing in the Animal’s
Friend or elsewhere. (Purdy 97)
5 Clearly, this was a subject that mattered to him very much. As he remarked to Florence
Henniker: 
I suppose I have missed the mark in the pig-killing scene the papers are making
such a fuss about: I fully expected that, though described in that particular place for
the purely artistic reason of bringing out A.’s [Arabella’s] character, it might serve a
humane  end  in  showing  people  the  cruelty  that  goes  on  unheeded  under  the
barbarous régime we call civilization. (Purdy 94)
6 Separately, he wrote on the same subject to Lady Jeune:
You will have seen how “Jude” has been attacked in two or three quarters. I am
much surprised at the nature of the attack – the book having been announced as for
men & women: & my only fear having been that it was too much a book of moral
teaching  –  the  inculcation  of  Mercy,  to  youths  &  girls  who  have  made  a  bad
marriage, & to animals who have to be butchered. (Purdy 97)
7 Mercy, then, is what matters to Hardy, so it must have been a source of some satisfaction
to him that the editor of the Animal’s Friend chose to reprint the piece under the title “A
Merciful Man (Scene from Jude the Obscure), by Thomas Hardy”. Hardy – and his readers
– would have caught the allusion.  The expression “a merciful  man is  merciful  to his
beast”  was  by  then  proverbial;  it  appears,  for  example,  in  Christy’s  compendium of
Proverbs, Maxims and Phrases of All Ages (1890) (Christy 34). As we shall see, Hardy had used
it himself, in an earlier work; and as even this brief introduction suggests, the question of
humankind’s relationship to the non-human was to him both profoundly important and
profoundly troubling. 
8 Put rather differently, Hardy’s abiding concern for the non-human shaped his view of
humanity.  Indeed,  it  shaped  in  him  a  strong  sense  of  humankind’s  inhumanity,  an
inhumanity expressed not only in acts of occasional or random cruelty towards animals,
but,  increasingly,  through  their  systematic  exploitation.  The  aim  of  this  essay  is,
therefore, to explore the way in which Hardy’s response to the non-human informs his
view of what it is to be human, and how in turn that view challenges our own perceptions
of humanity.
9 In his critical biography of Hardy, Paul Turner notes the special significance of women to
both his life and work (Turner 3). But, as Turner adds, “there was another notable feature
of his emotional make-up which was far more individual: a special feeling for animals”
(3):
This has often been dismissed as an amiable weakness, a neurotic symptom, or, in
the  case  of  his  dogs  and  cats,  a  displacement-reaction  to  childlessness.  It  was
actually  a  key-element  in  his  personality,  instinctive  in  childhood,  but  soon
justified intellectually by Darwinism. (Turner 3)
This “special feeling” suggests itself as a form of what we might now call “biophilia”.
Today, this is a phrase most closely associated with E. O. Wilson, and the idea that human
behaviour is shaped by a hard-wired instinct “which I will be so bold as to define as the
innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes” (Wilson 1). In the words of David
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Orr, this “innate urge” to affiliate with other forms of life is “inscribed in the brain itself
[...] expressing tens of thousands of years of evolutionary experience” (Orr 422). Wilson’s
socio-biological arguments have always proven controversial. For my own purpose, and
without ruling out the way in which instinct may have shaped Hardy’s sensitivity to the
non-human “other”, it may be more productive to read his biophilia in the looser and
more general terms that were first used to define and describe it, not by E. O. Wilson, but
by Erich Fromm, in The Heart  of  Man (1964).  For Fromm, biophilia  is  a  “love of  life”
(Fromm 9), “a total orientation, an entire way of being” (41): “[t]he person who fully loves
life is attracted by the process of life and growth in all spheres” (43).
10 Perhaps  paradoxically,  because  Hardy’s  view of  life  is  often  thought  of  as  mordant,
pessimistic,  and  even  fatalistic,  Fromm’s  definition  perfectly  captures  Hardy’s  long
interest in life “in all spheres”. What Hardy wrote of the young Jude, abandoning his job
of bird-scaring, is also true of Hardy himself: “[a] magic thread of fellow-feeling united
his own life with theirs” (Hardy 2002, 9).
11 In  Fromm’s  formulation,  however,  this  kind  of  fellow  feeling  is  both  shaped  and
constrained by social as well as natural factors. In The Heart of Man, Fromm reflects on the
social conditions necessary for biophilia to exist. It assumes, he wrote, abundance rather
than scarcity, “both economically and psychologically”, the “abolition of social injustice”
(Fromm 48),  and freedom, although of a particular kind: as Fromm notes,  “[i]t is not
enough that men are not slaves; if social conditions further the existence of automatons,
the result will not be love of life, but love of death” (49). 
12 In Hardy’s own case, his biophilia was certainly shaped by childhood experience – as a
child, it was “animal life that he watched with the greatest interest, and felt closest to”
(Turner 7) – but, as a young adult, it was also shaped by his immersion in the intellectual
milieu of Victorian Britain. Hardy read widely, citing Comte, Mill, Spencer, and Hume, but
he was particularly influenced by Darwin.
13 As Levine notes (36), it is conventional, when discussing Hardy, to underline the fact that
Darwin drew attention to the conflict and struggle that animated the non-human world.
Somewhat  ironically,  therefore,  Hardy’s  hopes  for  mercy  must  be  set  against  his
recognition that mercy was itself lacking in the animal world. As he asked of Frederic
Harrison, “when will the still more numerous terrestrial animals – our kin, having the
same ancestry – learn to be merciful?”
The fact  is  that  when you get  to  the bottom of  things you find no bed-rock of
righteousness  to rest  on –  nature is  unmoral  –  & our puny efforts  are those of
people who try to keep their leaky house dry by wiping off the waterdrops from the
ceiling. (Millgate 1990, 191)
In  turn,  Hardy  recognised  the  wasted  potential  of  what  he  famously  called  “the
Unfulfilled Intention, which makes life what it is”:
The leaf  was  deformed,  the  curve  was  crippled,  the  taper  was  interrupted;  the
lichen  ate  the  vigour  of  the  stalk,  and  the  ivy  slowly  strangled  to  death  the
promising sapling. (Hardy 1998, 52)
At  the  same  time,  however,  Darwin  provided  Hardy  with  an  intellectual  framework
within which to situate a powerful and positive response to the entirety of life. Alongside
the determinism and fatalism that have so often been read into Hardy’s work, there is, as
Beer points out, “a sense of plenitude” strongly linked to his understanding of Darwin,
and it finds expression “in the moment-by-moment fullness of the text” (241). (Inevitably,
one thinks of  “The Rally”,  and Tess’s  exquisitely rendered journey into the “verdant
plain” of the Froom [Hardy 2003, 102], whose waters are as “rapid as the shadow of a
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cloud” [Hardy 2003, 103].) As Levine notes in his discussion of “Hardyesque enchantment”
(Levine 38),  Hardy “was more in love with life – and in Darwinian ways – than most
Darwinian readings suggest” (37).
14 In part, at least, this is a sense of wonder at the richness and diversity of life. When, in
Under the Greenwood Tree, Fancy and Dick celebrate their marriage beneath the spreading
arms of the eponymous greenwood, their lives are overlaid with the countless lives that
have sprung from it:
Many hundreds of birds had been born amidst the boughs of this single tree, tribes
of rabbits and hares had nibbled at its bark from year to year, quaint tufts of fungi
had  sprung  from  the  cavities  of  its  forks,  and  countless  families  of  moles  and
earthworms had crept about its roots. (Hardy 1992, 193)
As Turner points out (32), the implied allusion is not only to Darwin’s “great Tree of Life”,
which covers the earth’s surface “with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications”
(Darwin 172), but to the image of an “entangled bank”, with which Darwin concludes The
Origin of  Species.  Clothed with “many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the
bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp
earth,” there is, he argues, “grandeur in this view of life” (Darwin 459).
15 There are also consequences to it. From Darwin, Hardy took not only the concept of a
common origin of all species but, by extension, an innate kinship that shifted the ethical
basis of behaviour from “the area of mere mankind to that of the whole animal kingdom”
(Millgate 1985, 377). Writ large, this is the challenge of what Raymond Williams called the
crisis (and counter-tradition) of “the knowable community” (and the shared “social and
moral code” that it embodied) (Williams 15), an instability created by the need to include
voices  that  had  hitherto  been  excluded  from  dominant  forms  of  communication
(O’Connor 69). Evolution, as Hardy wrote, “shifted the centre of altruism from humanity
to the whole conscious world collectively” (Millgate 1985, 373). And it is clear that, for
Hardy, “the whole conscious world” could be a very wide one. This is the opening stanza
of “The Wind Blew Words”, from Moments of Vision (1917):
The wind blew words along the skies,
And these it blew to me
Through the wide dusk: “Lift up your eyes,
             Behold this troubled tree,
Complaining as it sways and plies;
             It is a limb of thee.
                                        (ll.1-6, Hardy 2001, 446-447)
In an ethical context, this is the point at which we move beyond the biocentric to the
ecocentric. “[E]cosystems are complexly unified wholes,” Warren argues in “The Rights of
the  Nonhuman World”  (1983),  “in  which  one  element  generally  cannot  be  damaged
without causing repercussions elsewhere in the system”:
If sentience is a necessary, as well as a sufficient, condition for having moral rights,
then we cannot ascribe such rights to oceans, mountains and the like; yet we have a
moral  obligation  to  protect  such  natural  resources  from  excessive  damage  at
human hands,  both because of  their  value to us and to future generations,  and
because  they are  intrinsically  valuable,  as  elements  of  the  planetary  biosystem.
(Warren 131)
As Hardy continues in “The Wind Blew Words”, “[t]hey are stuff of thy own frame” (l.12,
Hardy 2001, 447).
16 Thus, Hardy’s belief that “all organic creatures are of one family” (Millgate 1985, 373)
shapes and determines his in-principle inclusivity, his philosophical willingness to step
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beyond  the  narrow bounds  of  “human”,  the  better,  one  might  argue,  to  realise  his
humanity. For Hardy, to be human was also to be humane; indeed, it was in a letter to the
Humanitarian League that he wrote of the “far-reaching” ethical consequences of the
common origin of species (376). But his expanded and expansive sense of humanity also
explains his ambivalence towards humanism, and the humanistic tradition that its critics
now berate for the sense it creates of “a gulf between ourselves and other animals” (Gray
17). As Hardy continued in the same letter:
While man was deemed to be a creation apart from all other creations, a secondary
or tertiary morality was considered good enough towards the “inferior” races; but
no person who reasons nowadays can escape the trying conclusion that this is not
maintainable. (Millgate 1985, 377)
Trying it no doubt was. Hardy was not, after all, a philosopher. We have his word for it; as
he remarked late in life (1917), his critics repeatedly erred in treating “my works of art as
if  they  were  a  scientific  system of  philosophy,  although I  have  repeatedly  stated  in
prefaces and elsewhere that the views in them are seemings, provisional impressions only”
(Millgate 1985, 406). Although Hardy may be protesting too much, it is fair to say that his
close connection with the non-human world has less  to do with abstruse matters  of
philosophy than a reflexive “hatred of cruelty” and the unnecessary suffering it created
(Millgate 1990, 170).1
17 As Hardy knew from his own upbringing, and his immersion in the working world of a
region that still  made its living from agriculture, there is also a tension between the
natural and the social, between the non-human world, and the human world with which
it is interleaved. At its most immediate and obvious, this is reflected in the long-standing
and traditional practices that Hardy evokes in the pig-killing scene in Jude. Arabella is, of
course, the daughter of a pig-breeder, and whilst readers may recall very little else of her
first conversation with Jude than the pig’s pizzle that prompts it, she and her friends are
at the time washing “pig’s chitterlings” in the river by a “small homestead, having a
garden and pig-sties attached” (Hardy 2002, 33). “Pigs must be killed”, as Arabella bluntly
remarks (59); for her, Jude’s reaction to the necessary process of slaughter simply makes
him a “tender-hearted fool” (58).
18 At the same time, however, Hardy was also touched by a wider and deeper historical shift
in patterns of behaviour towards animals. As Keith Thomas argues, the Enlightenment
laid the foundations for human “dominion over nature”, but that very power nourished
“an  increasingly  sentimental  view  of  animals”  (Thomas  29;  301).  As  White  notes,
Thomas’s  thesis  explains  “the  simultaneous rise  of  sentimentality  characteristic  of
middle-class pet keeping and the unprecedented exploitation of animals in sport,  the
marketplace,  and  the  laboratory”  (White  61).  Affection,  Ritvo  explains  in  a  detailed
account of the role of animals in Victorian society, accompanied exploitation (Ritvo 2-3).
19 It is easy to find Hardy in these ideas. If pet ownership was (for the middle classes) a new
but also a now widespread phenomenon (White 59), Hardy was certainly representative.
Indeed, his many pets mattered so much to him that he created a pet cemetery at Max
Gate (Millgate 2004, 240). As he wrote to Florence Henniker (31 Oct 1920), “[w]hat silly
people we are to get so attached to pets whose natural lives, as we well know, must in
every reasonable probability finish before our own!” (Millgate 1990, 349). At the same
time, however, that fellow feeling – that biophilia – manifested itself in other ways. Like
many other members of the Victorian public, Hardy also applied his “tender feeling for
household  pets”  (White  61)  to  the  increasingly  widespread  and  instrumental  use  of
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animals across society, and more specifically, their use and misuse by a newly emergent
(and ascendant) science: Hardy’s engagement with and opposition to vivisection is just
another  aspect  of  his  life’s  work  that  critics  have  tended  to  overlook.  As  Millgate
elegantly  summarizes  it,  Hardy  was  “a  passionate  proponent  of  such  causes  as
slaughterhouse  reform and  an  active  supporter  of  animal  welfare  organizations  and
movements for the abolition of fox-hunting, stag-hunting, hare-coursing, and other field
sports” (Millgate 1990, 170).
20 Here, it may be helpful to consider Hardy’s perspective in the light of Jacques Derrida’s
thoughts on “The Animal That Therefore I Am”. The differences are as instructive as the
similarities.  Mindful  of  the  “sinister  connotations”  of  biological  (or  in  his  words,
“biologistic”) continuism, Derrida opens his argument by insisting on the discontinuity –
the “rupture” – between human and non-human (Derrida 30):
I have thus never believed in some homogenous continuity between what calls itself
man and he calls the animal. I am not about to do so now. That would be worse than
sleepwalking [...] (Derrida 30)
At the same time – and here his language overlaps with Hardy’s own evocation of an
extended community or collectivity – Derrida insists that, “[b]eyond the edge of the so-
called human” (the stress is important), there lies a “heterogeneous multiplicity of the
living”, or more precisely, of relations between the living, but also between the living and
the dead, the organic and the inorganic:
These relations are at once intertwined and abyssal, and they can never be totally
objectified. They do not leave room for any simple exteriority of one term with
respect to another. (Derrida 31)
It follows that “one will never have the right to take animals to be the species of a kind
that would be named The Animal” (Derrida 31). As he adds, “[i]t is a question of words”
(33), or, more exactly, of that one word which, “in the singular and without further ado”,
designates “every living thing that is held not to be human” (31). And for Derrida, the
consequence of this “auto-situation of man or of the human Dasein as regards what is
living and animal life” (24) – its constitutive impact – is just that transformation in the
treatment of animals to which White and Ritvo refer, and from which Hardy recoils. Over
the past  two centuries,  Derrida argues,  what he calls  the “traditional  exploitation of
animal energy” has given way to an “unprecedented [...] subjection of the animal” (25),
even as  humans have done all  they can “to dissimulate  this  cruelty  or  hide it  from
themselves” (26). In turn, Derrida all but argues that this process of dissimulation extends
to a philosophical tradition that asks whether the animal can “think, reason, or speak”,
when what matters is simply (but above all else) their capacity for suffering (27). “The
first and decisive question,” he argues, following Jeremy Bentham, is “whether animals can
suffer” (27).
21 There  are,  therefore,  strong  parallels  between Derrida’s  argument,  and  Hardy’s  own
position.  Both  register  the  shifts  to  which  Derrida  refers;  both  focus  firmly  on  the
suffering it creates. As Hardy remarked to William Archer in February, 1901:
What are my books but one long plea against “man’s inhumanity to man” – woman
– and to the lower animals? [...] Whatever may be the inherent good or evil of life, it
is certain that men make it much worse than it need be. (quoted in Millgate 2004,
379)
Seen in these terms, Jude reveals the scale of its ambition. As Hardy observed in a letter to
Florence Henniker, “I think it turns out to be a novel which ‘makes for’ humanity – more
than any other I have written” (Purdy 94). This was an argument his more perceptive
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critics could accept.  The American novelist  William Dean Howells,  writing in Harper’s
Weekly, whilst allowing that “there are many displeasing things in the book” – the pig-
killing scene amongst them – stressed that “they are deeply founded in the condition, if
not in the nature of humanity” (Cox 255). “It is human”, wrote D. F. Hannigan in the
Westminster Review, “in the widest sense of that comprehensive word” (273). 
22 This is  a refrain that may be found throughout Hardy’s work,  and as his remarks to
Archer suggest, his concern with the suffering of non-humans is also – perhaps always –
linked  to  the  suffering  of  humans;  and  so,  perhaps  problematically,  Hardy  draws  a
connection between both “man’s inhumanity to man” and his inhumanity towards (in the
same breath) women and animals. Yet this too finds its basis in the attitudes that Thomas
identifies and discusses at length: the “firm line” (Thomas 41) drawn between man and
beast had profound and lasting consequences for those groups that were seen as socially
marginal  or  even  inferior,  and  which  were in  turn  seen  as  less  than  human  (and,
therefore, more like animals) (41-43). Women were sometimes amongst them (43). This is
a conflation that Hardy himself  may be making when he declares that Arabella is “a
complete and substantial female animal – no more, no less” (Hardy 2002, 33). Thus, and
whilst Turner (3) separates Hardy’s concern for women from his interest in animals, the
predicament of both are essentially interwoven.
23 This is particularly apparent in the scene in Tess where, pursued, she seeks refuge in a
plantation.  Here,  she  encounters  the  aftermath  of  a  shooting  party:  pheasants
everywhere, some dead, many injured and “writhing in agony” (Hardy 2003, 278). As she
puts the stricken birds out of their misery, she recalls childhood glimpses of the men
(Hardy is explicit) who make it “their purpose to destroy life – in this case harmless
feathered  creatures,  brought  into  being  by artificial  means  solely  to  gratify  these
propensities – at once so unmannerly and so unchivalrous towards their weaker fellows
in Nature’s teeming family” (279). 
24 Clearly, hunting, fishing, shooting are themselves long-standing rural pursuits, but what
is in question here is not (or not only) their usurpation by the socially privileged, but
their systematic expansion along highly structured and organized lines. By Hardy’s time,
as Millgate records, the shooting of game birds had become a “mass slaughter” that
Hardy found “particularly” oppressive: “Lord Wimborne’s guests, a few weeks before the
ball which the Hardys attended in December 1881, had killed in one day 1,418 pheasants”
(Millgate 2004, 218). In Hardy’s hands, however, the aftermath of this kind of slaughter
also echoes Tess’s  own suffering,  “their fate in some sense imaging hers” (219).  It  is
notable that, in this moment of encounter, Tess’s response also manifests that tension
between customary and educated languages, the one “thwarted by ignorance”, the other
“limited in humanity”,  that  Williams (107)  identifies  and discusses,  and which Hardy
seeks to circumvent. In spite of her education at a National School – perhaps even to spite
her education – Tess slips back into dialect. For the reader, it is difficult to escape the
feeling that  this  educated language (a  language of  abstraction)  is  itself  indicted in a
process of  instrumentalization that affects people and place,  human and non-human.
Tess is herself the subject of that process when, later in the novel, she encounters the
alien  presence  of  a  steam-threshing  machine,  harbinger  of  the  twentieth-century
industrialization of farming, and is given the job of helping to feed it with sheaves of corn
(“[f]or some probably economical reason it was usually a woman who was chosen for this
particular duty” [Hardy 2003, 327]). Whilst the machine still turns, she cannot rest; and
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the  machine  does  not  rest.  Its  demand  is  ceaseless,  and  the  hum  of  the  thresher
“increased to a raving whenever the supply of corn fell short” (Hardy 2003, 327).
25 Language, then, is another aspect of the imposition of subject upon object – or, following
Derrida, objectified “Animal” – and it is also implicated in the domination of women by
men. This is the process enacted in “Heiress and Architect” (Hardy 2001, 75), a poem in
which  a  highly stylized  and  symbolic  conversation  between  eponymous  heiress  and
architect is explicitly framed as a conflict between the life-affirming and the life-denying,
a conflict in which the “cold, clear voice, and cold, clear view” (l.7) of the “arch-designer”
(l.2) inevitability triumph, and the heiress is revealed as both subject to and subjugated
by  the  architect,  symbolic  representative  of  reductive  Enlightenment  reason.  Tess’s
predicament is itself similar. She is never seen whole: “[s]he was not an existence, an
experience, a passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but herself” (Hardy 2003, 91).
As Eagleton suggests, “the novel itself oscillates between treating Tess as an object of
erotic  desire  or  ‘scientific’  investigation,  and  feeling  genuine  compassion  for  her”
(Eagleton 194).
26 Something of Hardy’s own ambivalence resurfaces in a later letter, of 30 November, 1906.
Asked by the suffrage leader, Millicent Fawcett, for his views on women’s suffrage, Hardy
gives it his support, but adds, “I fear I shall spoil the effect of this information by giving
you my reasons” (Millgate 1990, 192). It was not, he explained, for their own sake that he
gave his support, but because he felt that “the woman’s vote” would help “break up the
present pernicious conventions in respect of manners, customs, religion”, amongst them
“sport (that so-called educated men should be encouraged to harass & kill for pleasure
feeble creatures by mean stratagems)” and “slaughter-houses (that they should be dark
dens of cruelty)” (192).
27 In short, Hardy’s views are sometimes conflicted; they do not necessarily square neatly
with our own ethical arguments or belief systems or sense of what is or should be valued.
But there is a further, perhaps prosaic reason why Hardy’s own, deeply-felt views do not
necessarily  translate  into  powerful  and  articulate  indictments  of  human  cruelty,  or
philosophically compelling commentaries on the nature of humankind, and that is the
simple fact that, as a working writer, he was dependent on the tastes and whims of his
readers.
28 To illustrate the point, take what may be one of Hardy’s most extraordinary scenes, from
what is certainly one of his least read novels: The Hand of Ethelberta, Hardy’s premature
attempt to break free from “writing for ever about sheepfarming” (Millgate 1985, 105). In
the novel, Ethelberta (a now marriageable heiress) discovers that she is the subject of a
suit by a man named Neigh. Concerned to know more about him, and hearing that he has
an estate just outside London, she takes a train out into the countryside to investigate.
Finding the ornamental gate that seems to mark the entrance to the estate, she and her
sister walk up the drive to a large lake. Night is now falling; the fog draws in, and the
moon casts its “diffused light” (Hardy 1997, 185):
Ethelberta could not resist being charmed with the repose of the spot, and hastened
on  with  curiosity  to  reach  the  other  side  of  the  pool,  where,  by  every  law  of
manorial topography, the mansion would be situated. (Hardy 1997, 185)
But “where should have been the front door of a mansion” she instead finds a roughly
fenced paddock, filled with near starved horses (Hardy 1997, 185). Nearby, she discovers
an “open-air larder” in which “[h]orses’ skulls, ribs, quarters, legs, and other joints” are
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hanging (186). Then, she and her companion hear through the “mute and sleepy air” the
“stygian” howling of the hounds to whom these horses are to be fed (186).
29 At this point, it should be noted that Hardy advertised the novel as a comedy. Perhaps he
meant it to be a black one. In any event, Hardy’s handling of the scene is understated;
although he underlines its “intense melancholy” (Hardy 1997, 186) and its effect on the
“two lone young women” (187), it is difficult to read it without wondering what Dickens
might have made of a revelation so graphic and appalling (du Maurier’s illustration does
some justice to it).  What Hardy instead stresses is  Neigh’s  family history,  discovered
through inquiry, which reveals that his father married a cook (188), or, in the revision of
1877, that their fortune was newly made by “the knacker business and tanning” (446).
Thus, as Dolin points out, the issue for Ethelberta is, on the one hand, “the taint of the
servant class”, or on the other, “the taint of the arriviste” (446). What the issue is not – as
it might be to a 21st-century reader – is (say) the appalling conditions of the skeletal
horses on whom Ethelberta chances, or the fact that they are to be fed to hounds which
have in turn been bred solely to hunt, not for food, but for pleasure. Perhaps Hardy was
content to leave these concerns for his readers to construct. Or perhaps Hardy’s handling
of this particular scene reflects a more general point about this highly “superficial and
synthetic”  novel  (xx).  As  Dolin  makes  clear  in  his  introduction,  Hardy  was  caught
between his own concerns and interests,  and the constraints placed upon him by his
editors and by extension his readers (xxvii).  As a result,  his novels oscillate between
“imitation”  and  “originality”,  “now  advancing  into  dangerous  territory,  now
withdrawing to more familiar ground” (xxvii).
30 Here as elsewhere, therefore, Hardy’s work was constrained by the circumstances of its
production and the nature of its reception. What might Hardy have written – and written
of life entire – had he not also been wrestling with the prejudices and preferences of his
readers? The answer, I think, becomes apparent as Hardy becomes more firmly
established as a writer and more certain of his own voice. The 1880s, Millgate notes, saw
the “surfacing of some of the social and humanitarian concerns that would be central to
Hardy’s subsequent life and work”, amongst them the “sufferings of animals” (Millgate
2004, 218). By the 1890s, Hardy was increasingly willing to court controversy. In his last
novel  (Jude),  as  Eagleton notes,  he  takes  “the  three  major  ideological  institutions  of
Victorian society – religion, education and sexuality – and censures them remorselessly”
(Eagleton 202).  But  as  I  have  also  suggested,  Jude represents  one  of  his  most  direct
engagements with what was for him another and integral aspect of humankind’s lack of
loving-kindness:  its  treatment  of  animals.  As  Morgan  notes,  “[f]rom  the  boy  Jude’s
attempt to befriend the rooks,  his protest over the pig killing,  and his attack on the
donkey beater  to  Sue’s  anguish over  trapped creatures  and beyond,  Jude  the  Obscure
approximates a veritable tract on humanitarianism” (Morgan 130). As a contemporary
critic complained, the novel reads “almost like one prolonged scolding from beginning to
end” (Cox 250), but the call is quite clear: it is, as Morgan puts it, “for an end to needless
suffering and oppression for all living creatures” (Morgan 130).
31 Small wonder, then, that the Animal’s Friend should have chosen to super-add the words
“A Merciful Man” when it reproduced the pig-killing chapter; I would suggest that it was
not only Jude to whom it refers. But the periodical’s choice of title was also apt because,
as  I  mentioned  in  my  introduction,  Hardy  had  used  the  phrase  “a  merciful  man  is
merciful to his beast” in a short story entitled “A Few Crusted Characters”. Published in
Life’s Little Ironies in 1894, this is Hardy’s wry account of a country parson who, having left
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a young couple locked up in his church whilst the husband-to-be sobers up, then forgets
all about them, and spends the day hunting. “Fine exercise for the horses!” he shouts to
his clerk as they pursue the hunt; “a merciful man is merciful to his beast” (Hardy 1977,
167).
32 The parson’s name is Toogood, and transparently, his surname exaggerates his virtues. By
the time he returns home, his beast is “wellnigh [sic] tired down to the ground” (Hardy
1977, 168). And whilst his exhausted horse still commands more of his interest than the
unmarried couple, it is difficult to square Christian compassion with the fact that (as the
narrator maintains) “he’d been in at the death of three thousand foxes” (166).
33 In his introduction to the collection, Pinion notes that nearly all the stories “belong to the
interval between Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure, and, like these two novels,
the most serious of them were written ‘with a purpose’” (Hardy 1977, 7). Hardy’s story
about the parson is hardly the weightiest of them, but it too has a depth that the more
perceptive reader would have recognized. Whilst proverbial, the phrase (“a merciful man
is merciful to his beast”) has its echo, and perhaps its origin, in (quite naturally) Proverbs
(12:10). In the words of the King James Version, a “righteous man regardeth the life of his
beast: but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel”.2 For Hardy, however, Christianity
was,  amongst  other  theologies,  deeply  implicated in contemporary attitudes  towards
animals. As he wrote to Frederic Harrison (17 October, 1906), whom Millgate calls “the
leading British exponent of Positivism, the fundamentally optimistic system of conduct
and belief advocated by the French philosopher Auguste Comte” (Millgate 1990, 190):
The question, indeed, of the treatment of animals is a tremendous one. As long as
Christian & other theologies were really credited,  & the non-human animal was
regarded  as  a  creature  distinct  from  man,  there  was  consistency  in  treating
“brutes” brutally. “Arise, Peter, kill & eat,” was a natural command to a man with a
soul concerning animals without one. (Millgate 1990, 190)
Much hinges, as Hardy suggests, on that one word “brute”, with all that it implies and all
that it permits (once again, there is a strong parallel with Derrida’s argument, with its
contempt for the monolithic construct of thought and feeling embodied in “Animal”).
And it is,  perhaps, Hardy’s belief in the power and potency of constructs such as the
“Animal” that explains his continued pessimism, even as the theologies he indicted were
losing their hold.  “I  almost think that people were less pitiless towards their fellow-
creatures – human & animal – under the Roman Empire than they are now”, he wrote to
Florence Henniker soon after the end of the Great War (5 June, 1919) (Millgate 1990, 330).
An entry made on his eightieth birthday is no less bleak:
Though  my  life,  like  the  lives  of  my  contemporaries,  covers  a  period  of  more
material advance in the world than any of the same length can have done in other
centuries, I do not find that real civilization has advanced equally. People are not
more humane, so far as I can see, then they were in the year of my birth. (Millgate
1985, 435)
34 Yet even as he became “increasingly sceptical” of “sanguine visions” such as Harrison’s
(Millgate 1990, 190), Hardy continued to commit himself and his resources as a writer to
the question of what it is to be human, and what we might mean by its “humanity”, given
such continuous and continuing evidence of  its  inhumanity.  Poems like “Wagtail  and
Baby” and “The Blinded Bird” lie beyond the scope of this short article, but, like sections
of  The Dynasts and many passages in his  novels,  Hardy’s  concern was consistent  and
persistent  even  if  (as  he  himself  pointed  out)  it  was  not  necessarily  philosophically
rigorous. Collectively, his engagement with what is narrowly called “the treatment of
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animals” – but we may instead regard as a commentary on the nature of humankind’s
“humanity” – remains just as compelling and provocative today as it did to the sometimes
horrified, occasionally enlightened readers of Jude.
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NOTES
1. In fact, the concept of suffering itself commands a philosophical dimension, which has in turn
been adapted as the basis for an environmental ethic, most famously articulated by Peter Singer,
author of Animal Liberation. Thus, and whilst other philosophers (amongst them Jacques Derrida)
have distinguished an emphasis on animal suffering from an ethical extensionism derived from a
shared  capacity  to  “think,  reason,  or  speak”  (Derrida  27),  Singer  argues  that  a  capacity  for
suffering  is  itself  rooted  in  sentience,  returning  the  argument  to  a  form  of  extensionism;
Derrida’s own argument is, like Singer’s, rooted in Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism (Singer 7).
2. In  an essay entitled “On the Merciful  Man”,  William McEwen writes  that  “a  good man is
merciful to his beast”, a derivation that takes us still nearer to the proverb that Hardy invokes
(McEwen 153).
ABSTRACTS
This paper approaches the subject of Hardy as a thinker of humanity through his response to
what  was  often  the  inhuman treatment  of  animals.  Registered  in  scenes  like  the  pig-killing
chapter in Jude the Obscure, later reprinted by the Victorian Society for the Protection of Animals
under the title “A Merciful Man”, Hardy’s work reflects a deep-rooted biophilia. This was in part
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shaped by his immersion in the latest thinking of his age. From Darwin, in particular, he took a
sense of kinship with all living things, and a profound appreciation of the richness and diversity
of  life.  At  the  same  time,  Hardy  instinctively  recoiled  from  any  form  of  cruelty.  This  was,
however, a moment in history when animals were made subject to unprecedented new levels of
exploitation and manipulation. Nor was the inhumanity of this kind of treatment – this process
of instrumentalization – confined to non-humans, as Hardy underlined in novels like Tess of the
d’Urbervilles. Whilst Hardy’s own thoughts were not always fully worked out, even when, as in
novels  like  The  Hand  of  Ethelberta,  his  imagination  conjured  extraordinary  scenes  of  animal
suffering, his later work suggests a growing willingness to censure cruelty, and an expansive
sense  of  what  might  be  meant  by  humanity  and humanitarianism.  Notwithstanding his  own
pessimism about the trajectory of human “progress”, and its apparent pursuit of the material at
the expense of the moral, this forms an important (if sometimes neglected) aspect of his work.
Cet article aborde la pensée hardyenne de l’humanité au prisme de la représentation par Hardy
du  traitement  inhumain  des  animaux.  Son  œuvre  révèle  une  profonde  biophilie  (amour  du
vivant), comme le montre la scène où le cochon est tué dans Jude the Obscure – scène réimprimée
plus tard par la société victorienne pour la protection des animaux sous le titre “A Merciful
Man”. Cette biophilie a été en partie inspirée à Hardy par les pensées les plus novatrices de son
temps. À Darwin, en particulier, il a emprunté l’idée d’une parenté entre tous les êtres vivants et
une  conception  profonde  de  la  diversité  de  la  vie.  En  même  temps,  Hardy  répugnait
naturellement à toute forme de cruauté, à un moment de l’histoire où les animaux étaient soumis
à  un  niveau  sans  précédent  d’exploitation  et  de  manipulation.  L’inhumanité  de  ce  type  de
traitement – ce processus d’instrumentalisation – n’était d’ailleurs pas réservé aux non humains,
comme l’a souligné Hardy dans Tess of the d’Urbervilles. Cette œuvre tardive suggère une volonté
grandissante  de  condamner  la  cruauté  et  une  perception  approfondie  de  ce  que  signifient
humanité et humanitarisme. Malgré le pessimisme de Hardy à l’égard de la trajectoire du progrès
humain et sa recherche apparente du matériel aux dépens du moral, cela constitue un aspect
important de son œuvre, bien qu’il soit parfois négligé.
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